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Hindu-Muslim violence has plagued India for centuries. Deaths caused by Hindu-Muslim 
violence constitute a small proportion of the Indian population; therefore the historical 
precedence and incendiary nature of this violence in India is cause for concern. 
Additionally, because India is geographically positioned between two majority Muslim 
states, India has a vested interest in addressing its violence problem so that it does not 
create national-level disturbances as it has in the past. 
This thesis conducts a comparison of Hindu-Muslim violence in India at the 
national- and state-levels over two periods, 1950–1976 and 1977–1995, to demonstrate 
that Hindu-Muslim violence rose from the late 1970s through the 1990s, due to three 
main factors: 1) the organizational demise of the INC and the decay of the consociational 
system; 2) the emergence of the communal political party, the BJP; and 3) state-level 
variations of Hindu-Muslim violence based on the presence or absence of the INC’s 
monopoly of power in the state. 
The analysis recommends that only through a transparent and comprehensive 
communal violence policy and the promotion of the nonpoliticization of sociocultural 
data pertaining to the Indian population will the Indian government be effective in 
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Hindus and Muslims have a long history of living together on the Indian 
subcontinent, experiencing periods of volatility offset by periods of relative peace. 
Muslim invaders settled in North India in the seventh century, during which time they 
incrementally conquered the northern region. South India also witnessed the arrival of 
Muslims during this same period, but the Muslims largely arrived as merchants from 
across the Indian Ocean. Conventional wisdom contends that these traders, in search of 
business opportunities, quickly and peacefully assimilated themselves into the Hindu 
communities of the south. Consequently, many historians and political scientists alike 
attribute the disparities in Hindu-Muslim violence to each region’s historical experiences 
of Muslim migration. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Following independence in 1947 and the brutal violence of the partition, India 
experienced a period wherein Hindu-Muslim violence was relatively low. However, the 
late 1970s saw a gradual increase in violence that peaked in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. After almost 30 years of relative Hindu-Muslim peace while under Indian 
National Congress (INC) political dominance, what caused the increases of Hindu-
Muslim violence in India from the late 1970s into the early 1990s? A correlation exists 
between the organizational decline of the INC and increases in Hindu-Muslim violence 
experienced in India during this time, but does a causal relationship exist? Did this 
violence increase uniformly across India, or were there variations? An additional 
correlation presents itself in the solid emergence of the communal political party, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); therefore, did the BJP contribute to increases in Hindu-
Muslim violence?1 
                                                 
1 This thesis uses the term communal as it is historically used in India to reference “politics and 
conflict based on religious groupings.” Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), 4.  
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B. IMPORTANCE 
The study of Hindu-Muslim violence is of utmost importance to India’s internal 
security and economic development because of the substantial size of the Muslim 
minority population and because India is flanked by two Muslim-dominated nations on 
its borders. Ranging from small personal assaults to lethal riots, large peaks of Hindu-
Muslim violence are a regular occurrence throughout India. Hindu-Muslim violence 
peaked when it claimed 1,337 lives in India in 1992.2 Again, Hindu-Muslim violence 
plagued the nation in 2002 during the Godhra riots in Gujarat. The Godhra riots were 
estimated to have resulted in over 800 deaths. This type of violence creates domestic 
volatility and oftentimes triggers a cycle of violence among Hindus and Muslims, where 
one event perpetuates another, ultimately weakening internal security overall. The Indian 
Ministry of Home Affairs 2013–2014 Annual Report attributes 133 deaths in India to 
communal violence.3 Although death ranges from 94–1337 are admittedly small numbers 
for a country the size of India, the incendiary nature of Hindu-Muslim violence is cause 
for concern. Furthermore, India already faces other internal security challenges such as 
“Muslim separatists in Kashmir, . . . terrorist insurgencies . . . in the so-called ‘Seven 
Sisters’ states.” and, most prominently, left wing extremism posed by the Naxalite 
insurgency.4 While recent communal violence numbers are considerably lower than in 
the early 1990s, unexpected increases in Hindu-Muslim violence have the potential to 
compound the already complex internal security problem set in India.  
Moreover, India’s demographic profile with regard to its Muslim minority is 
significant because of India’s sheer size. On a global scale, India is home to the world’s 
                                                 
2 Ashutosh Varshney and Steven I. Wilkinson, “Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim 
Violence in India, Version 2, October 8, 2004,” http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04342. 
3 Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2013–2014 (New Delhi: Ministry of 
Home Affairs, 2014), 93, www.mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1314.pdf. 
4 J. A. Piazza, “Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India,” Security Studies 19 (2010): 100. 
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“third-largest population of Muslims.”5 India’s 2001 census, the last census published 
with socio-cultural demographic data enumerating religion in India, found that Muslims 
account for 138 million of its citizens.6 The Pew Research Center estimates that from 
2010 to 2030, India’s Muslim population will constitute 14–16 percent of India’s 
population.7 These estimates are consistent with the government of India’s 2001 census, 
which identified Muslims as the largest minority group in this Hindu majority country.8 
Hindu-Muslim violence, therefore, could potentially touch large portions of the Indian 
population that reside throughout the entire country.9 Whether these communities are 
incited to violence or resisting violence, they still are affected in some form by the 
manifestation of Hindu-Muslim violence within India.10 Chapter III will address this 
occurrence. 
Lastly, potential increases in Hindu-Muslim violence in India would have a 
detrimental impact on the country’s economy. Since implementing its liberalization 
policies in 1991, India has focused on attracting business and investment opportunities 
                                                 
5 Andrew Kohut, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of 
the World’s Muslim Population, Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center and The Pew Forum, October 
2009, http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx; Luis Lugo et al., The 
Future of the Global Muslim Populations: Projections for 2010–2030, (Washington, DC: The Pew 
Research Center and The Pew Forum, January 2011) 76, www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-
global-muslim-population. 
6 Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001 Census Socio-Cultural Aspects: Religious 
Composition, New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, 2001, 
www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Social_and_cultural/Religion.aspx. 
Socio-cultural data for India’s 2011 census was not published with the initial release of information in 
2012.  
7Lugo et al., The Future of the Global Muslim Populations, 76.  
8 Pew also estimated the Muslim population in India at 14.4 percent in 2010. Pew Research Center, 
“Global Religious Diversity: Half of the Most Religiously Diverse Countries are in Asia-Pacific Region,” 
Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center, April 2014, www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/global-religious-
diversity. The government of India’s 2001 census calculated the Muslim population at 13.4 percent of 
India’s population overall. Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001 Census Socio-Cultural 
Aspects.  
9 Lugo et al., The Future of the Global Muslim Populations, 77. The Pew Research Center’s report 
states, “Muslims live throughout India. According to the 2001 census . . . Uttar Pradesh . . . Bihar . . . West 
Bengal . . . Assam . . . Kerala . . . [and] Jammu and Kashmir” are states with large percentages of Muslims. 
10 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 100. As discussed by Varshney, even states that are 
considered to be “communally peaceful” can experience communal violence in the face of large-scale 
occurrences of Hindu-Muslim violence across the nation.  
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for increased economic growth. Establishing and maintaining internal security is crucial 
for drawing in foreign direct investment and economic activity.11 Therefore, increases in 
Hindu-Muslim violence could add volatility to India’s internal security and potentially 
deter investors, ultimately affecting negative economic growth. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
To answer the question of what led to increases in Hindu-Muslim violence from 
the late 1970s through the 1990s, this thesis points to three main factors: 1) the 
organizational demise of the INC and the decay of the consociational system; 2) the 
emergence of the communal political party, the BJP; and 3) state-level variations of 
Hindu-Muslim violence based on the presence or absence of the INC’s monopoly of 
power in the state. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review examines the existing literature addressing India as a consociational 
democracy, the scholarly analysis of Hindu-Muslim violence in India, and the civic 
institutions theory for preventing Hindu-Muslim violence. 
Arend Lijphart argues India is a consociational democracy that exhibited strong 
elements of consociation theory between 1947 and 1967 and has since exhibited weaker 
elements.12 Lijphart’s consociational theory, also called power-sharing, is a democratic 
system for multi-ethnic societies in which political elites broker consensus among various 
ethnic groups.13 The theory’s four defining characteristics include “government by grand 
coalition, . . . cultural autonomy for religious and linguistic groups, . . . proportional 
representation” reserved for minorities, and “minority veto for the protection of 
                                                 
11 Shekhar Gupta, “Politics of Expediency,” Far Eastern Economic Review 156 (1993): 27. In his 
article, Gupta alludes to the “allowances for some upheaval and violence” already being made by foreign 
investors in India.  
12 Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” The American 
Political Science Review, 90, no. 2 (June., 1996): 258–268. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082883. 
13 Ibid., 258. 
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autonomy.”14 Lijphart asserts India’s consociational democracy weakened after 1967 
when INC could no longer sustain a grand coalition due to the mass mobilization of 
smaller, previously passive groups.15 This weakening in turn led to an “increase in 
intergroup . . . violence.”16  
Lijphart argues that even in India’s organizational decay, India’s and the INC’s 
consociational aspects are confirmed.17 As power-sharing weakened in India, the 
balances that previously existed between ethnic groups were thrown off and “intergroup 
tensions and violence . . . increased,” particularly with regard to Hindu-Muslim 
violence.18 Additionally, both Varshney and Ruparelia, separately present parallel 
arguments that agree with Lijphart’s idea that the centralization of linguistic federalism 
resulted in less cultural autonomy, ultimately manifesting intergroup tensions and 
violence in the form of the Punjabi Suba and the Kashmir insurgencies.19  
To date, three main scholarly sources for the documentation of communal 
violence emerge: Asghar Ali Engineer’s collections, P. R. Rajgopal’s analysis, and the 
Ashutosh Varshney and Steven Wilkinson dataset. Asghar Ali Engineer, a prominent 
Muslim-Indian scholar, publishes valuable commentary and yearly analyses on 
communal violence in India.20 His observations, however, constitute annual highlights 
and are subsequently not comprehensive. In his analysis, P. R. Rajgopal catalogs 
communal violence events but beyond citing “official sources” provides no consistent 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 258–261. 
15 Ibid., 259, 263–265. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 258. 
18 Ibid., 265. 
19 As cited in Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” 265, Ashutosh Varshney, “India's 
Democratic Exceptionalism and Its Troubled Trajectory,” Revised version of paper presented at the 1990 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. Sanjay Ruparelia, “How the 
Politics of Recognition Enabled India's Democratic Exceptionalism,” International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society 21, no. 1/4, Secular Imaginaries (December 2008): 39–56. 
20 See Appendix A. 
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reference to his sources.21 Furthermore, while indeed valuable, his analysis and 
observations “draw liberally from [his] own personal experiences” and can be argued to 
be less than objective.22 Ashutosh Varshney and Steven Wilkinson’s rigorous system for 
quantifying India’s experience of this violence consolidates the standardized observations 
of Hindu-Muslim violence recorded in articles in every edition of the Times of India 
(Bombay) from 1950–1995.23 Therefore, this thesis relies on the Varshney-Wilkinson 
dataset because it presents the most objective, comprehensive, and standardized 
collection of data cataloguing the occurrence of Hindu-Muslim violence in India.  
Subsequently, Varshney argues that the occurrence of Hindu-Muslim violence in 
India varies based on the presence or absence of civic institutions, or “associational forms 
of civic engagement.”24 He defines the “associational forms of civic engagement . . . [as] 
business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, 
festival organizations, trade unions, and cadre-based political parties.”25 Varshney argues 
that it is these groups that “promote peace . . .[whereas] their absence or weakness opens 
up space for communal violence.”26 Civic institutions, therefore, offer a forum for 
intercommunal engagement enabling the development of relationships that prevent the 
escalation of violence.27  
Contrariwise, Chapman argues that further analysis on the civic institutions theory 
is necessary based on three main points. He posits that: 
                                                 
21 P. R. Rajgopal, preface to Communal Violence in India (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 
1987). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 90–91; Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: 
Electoral Competition and Communal Riots (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 243–265, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10131638. For details on the reasons the Times of 
India (Bombay) was chosen, see Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 92 and Wilkinson, Votes and 
Violence, 248–249.  
24 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 3–4.  
25 Ibid. Varshney defines civil society as that “part of our lives that exists between the state on one 
hand and families on the other, that allows people to come together for a whole variety of public events and 
that is relatively independent of the state.”  
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid. 
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 The same civic institutions that can promote peaceful resolutions to ethnic 
conflict can also reinforce distrust amongst groups if these groups are not 
inclusive. 
 Selection effects limit the theory because of the difficulty in measuring 
whether civic associations have actually limited ethnic conflict by 
influencing their members or if the people involved in the associations are 
simply inherently opposed to political violence, thus lowering the 
occurrence of ethnic conflict. 
 Without a better understanding of civic institutions’ pre-existing 
characteristics and agendas, causation for the occurrence of ethnic conflict 
cannot be determined.28  
Chapman’s overall analysis is valid; however, his call for further analysis will be 
hugely time consuming because of the magnitude of its proposed solutions. As the further 
analysis is undertaken and completed, the development of civic institutions between 
different ethnic groups will be valuable because they get people talking, understanding 
each other’s concerns, and developing healthy community relationships that help in 
conflict resolution. 
Varshney’s analysis concludes that Hindu-Muslim violence is largely an urban 
phenomenon that is highly dependent on local-level variables addressing historical civic 
institutions.29 Therefore, his analysis consists of a city-level comparison of three pairs of 
cities, measuring Hindu-Muslim violence in view of civic institutions in place and 
historical political constructs.30 Varshney argues that the cause of communal violence in 
India requires analysis at the city-level because only at this level can local factors be 
taken into account.31 Any higher-level analyses (state and national) cannot properly 
account for the local context of the violence.32 In his conclusion, however, Varshney 
offers three methods by which civic linkages can be built: “movement politics aimed at 
                                                 
28 Terrence L. Chapman, “Unraveling the Ties between Civic Institutions and Attitudes toward 
Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (September 2008): 516–519, 528–529. 
29 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 3–7. 
30 Ibid., 5–9. 
31 Ibid., 7. 
32 Ibid., 284. 
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electoral politics, nonelectoral civic interventions, and initiatives led by the local 
administration.”33  
To date the literature does not address the application of Varshney’s theory above 
the local-level, likely because of the compelling case that Varshney himself presents in 
favor of properly accounting for local-level variables.34 However, this thesis shows that 
Varshney’s civic institutions theory can indeed be extended to a state-level analysis if the 
state overall is addressed as a place where civic linkages need to be developed. Utilizing 
Varshney’s first method for establishing civic linkages, “movement politics aimed at 
electoral politics,” this thesis takes the political parties in each state, which typically 
represent different ethnic and communal groups, and analyzes their tendency toward 
creating coalitions.35 This thesis argues that these “movements” constitute civic 
institutions at the state level to account for state-level variations in Hindu-Muslim 
violence.  
E. METHOD AND SOURCES 
1. Method 
This thesis utilizes a two-part study to reveal the sources of Hindu-Muslim 
violence from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. First, the thesis discusses the Nehruvian 
tradition as a consociational construct, the decay of the Nehruvian tradition, and the 
opening this decay created for the entrance of the BJP onto India’s political scene. 
Second, the thesis conducts a comparative study of the INC’s monopoly of power, or lack 
thereof, in the two states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh.  
a. Why Kerala and Uttar Pradesh? 
This thesis compares the states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh because of their 
similar historical economic conditions, religious diversity, and consistent qualitative 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 290. 
34 Ibid., 283–285. 
35 Ibid., 290. 
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experience of Hindu-Muslim violence. Both Kerala’s and Uttar Pradesh’s economies are 
primarily agro-based economies with the majority of their households being rural.36 In 
2003 and 2004, Uttar Pradesh began the expansion of its industrial, service, information 
technology, biotech, and tourism sectors by offering subsidies as well as fiscal and policy 
incentives to attract businesses to the state.37 Likewise, in 2007, Kerala also implemented 
similar steps toward attracting these same business sectors.38 Therefore, both agro-states 
are investing in similar business sectors with plans to utilize personnel and assets from 
agriculturally based economies.  
Demographically, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh have similar Muslim-Indian 
population percentages. The 2001 Government of India Census recorded that Muslims 
comprise 24.7 percent of Kerala’s population and 18.5 percent of Uttar Pradesh’s 
population.39 While Kerala is one of India’s smaller states and Uttar Pradesh is India’s 
largest state, Muslim-Indians represent roughly a quarter of either state’s population—
thus, similar proportional conditions exist for interactions between Muslim-Indians and 
other religious communities. Admittedly, Kerala’s significant Christian population 
creates a slightly different environment for interactions between religious communities in 
Kerala compared to interactions in Uttar Pradesh; however, no two Indian states are alike. 
Therefore, this thesis compares these two states based on their approximate Hindu-
Muslim population similarities.  
                                                 
36 Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001 Census Population, New Delhi: Office of the 
Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, 2001, 
www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Population.aspx?cki=lLXtaBp7hhZ; 
India Brand Equity Foundation, Uttar Pradesh April 2010 Presentation, 
http://www.ibef.org/states/uttarpradesh.aspx; India Brand Equity Foundation, Kerala April 2010 
Presentation, http://www.ibef.org/states/kerala.aspx; Recently, Kerala’s tourism sector and agricultural 
sectors have become near equal contributors of 9% to the state’s GDP. India Brand Equity Foundation, 
Kerala State Report August 2013, http://www.ibef.org/download/kerala-august-2013.pdf.  
37 India Brand Equity Foundation, Uttar Pradesh April 2010 Presentation. 
38 Kerala also included fiscal and policy incentives to attract computer hardware businesses. India 
Brand Equity Foundation, Kerala April 2010 Presentation. 
39 Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001 Census Population; India Brand Equity 
Foundation, Kerala April 2010 Presentation; India Brand Equity Foundation, Uttar Pradesh April 2010 
Presentation. 
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Finally, both states share consistent qualitative experiences of Hindu-Muslim 
violence. Varshney characterizes Kerala as a “communally peaceful” state in which 
“Hindu-Muslim peace normally prevail[s]” and Uttar Pradesh as a state with a consistent 
history of communal violence whose frequency of violence does not vary drastically over 
time.40 Both states exhibit the same consistent qualitative experience of communal 
violence, just on either end of the spectrum.41 In contrast, Gujarat is a state whose 
experience of Hindu-Muslim violence varies drastically; characterized by long periods 
without communal violence interrupted by years of extreme levels of communal 
violence.42 Neither Kerala nor Uttar Pradesh are subject to drastic surges in Hindu-
Muslim violence as is the case with Gujarat.43 
b. Severity and Frequency Variables 
This thesis examines a communal violence model that can be measured on two 
variables, severity and frequency. To hold the frequency variable constant so that the 
thesis could measure the variation of severity, the thesis only accounts for the annual 
average number of deaths per Hindu-Muslim violence incident that year. In this 
calculation, only incidents that resulted in a minimum one death will be included in the 
calculations. Averaging the number of deaths per incident reveals how intense Hindu-
Muslim violence was for that year and eliminates the possibility of counting an event that 
resulted in one death on the same scale as an event that resulted in 50 deaths. 
2. Sources 
This thesis utilizes a variety of primary and secondary sources to complete the 
analysis. The primary sources are government of India products such as the 2001 census 
results, Electoral Commission of India statistics, Ministry of Home Affairs statistics, 
India Brand Equality Foundation statistics, as well as the state government websites of 
                                                 





Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. Secondary sources include scholarly journal and newspaper 
articles found in the Economic and Political Weekly, the Hindu, the Times of India and 
the Indian Express. 
a. Communal Violence Source Challenges 
Finding consolidated incidents of communal violence throughout India is a 
challenge because of the volatility of the topic. It is widely acknowledged that when 
reporting on Hindu-Muslim violence, the Indian news media purposefully omits details 
that might attribute the culpability of either group in order to prevent the instigation of 
further violence. Wilkinson contends that the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs compiles 
and maintains statistics on communal violence incidents but does not publish them to the 
public for this very reason.44 In its annual reports, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs 
does address communal violence deaths and injuries; however, the reports do not 
differentiate these numbers by state nor by religious group.45  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Overall, this thesis analyzes the occurrence of post-independence Hindu-Muslim 
violence in India. Chapter II discusses the influence of the INC’s Nehruvian tradition on 
the incidence of Hindu-Muslim violence in post-Independence India and shows that one 
of the effects of the decay of the Nehruvian tradition was the political space created for 
the entrance of the BJP and subsequent Hindu-Muslim violence. Chapter III then 
compares the states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh based on the INC’s monopoly of power 
in each state and the effects the monopoly had on the states’ civic institutions and the 
subsequent experience of Hindu-Muslim violence. Chapter IV concludes that a state 
capable of developing intercommunal civic institutions in the form of political coalitions 
is less likely to experience high levels of Hindu-Muslim violence and communal violence 
overall because of the disincentive such violence poses to electoral success. 
                                                 
44 Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, 243–244. 
45 See Appendix B. 
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II. HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE INCREASES: INC’S 
ORGANIZATIONAL DEMISE THROUGH THE LENSES OF 
SECULARISM AND ECONOMIC POLICY  
The 1947 partition establishing India and Pakistan as two separate states was 
undoubtedly caused the worst demonstration of communal violence on the 
subcontinent.46 An estimated 12.5 million inhabitants were uprooted, leaving their homes 
for either India or the newly formed Pakistan.47 The eruption of centuries-old animosities 
brought to fore in the partition has oftentimes been blamed for the brutal violence that 
ensued. Death estimates range from “several hundred thousand to one million.”48 
Surprisingly however, in the years following the partition, Hindu-Muslim violence was 
relatively low throughout India. Some scholars argue that the brutality witnessed during 
this period exhausted the region; people had simply had enough of the violence. Others 
argue that the leadership of the INC—and Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership in particular—
directly contributed to the low numbers. Through the lenses of secular and economic 
policies, this chapter examines the INC’s consociational construct, commonly referred to 
as the Nehruvian tradition, and demonstrates its effects on the incidence of Hindu-
Muslim violence in post-independence India. It then examines the decay of the 
Nehruvian tradition through the same lenses to show that this decay not only contributed 
to increases in Hindu-Muslim violence but also created the political space for the 
emergence of the BJP and its associated Hindu-Muslim violence.49 
                                                 
46 Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 213–219. 
47 Ibid., 218–219. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1989), 91. Weiner attributes the emergence of “new forms of both party and non-party mass politics in 
India,” to the “de-institutionalization of the Congress party and the growth of patrimonial politics at the 
national level.”  
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A. CONSOCIATIONAL NEHRUVIAN TRADITION AND LOW HINDU-
MUSLIM VIOLENCE  
This section provides a brief summary of the formation of the Indian nation and 
the development of the Indian constitution and its consociational elements. The chapter 
then discusses the Nehruvian era’s secular and economic policies and the consequent 
Hindu-Muslim violence between 1950 and 1976. 
1. Partition and Formation of the Nation  
From the outset of the pursuit of an independent India, Mohandas Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, and other leaders of the INC “sought a unified [India] built around the 
principles of secularism and liberal democracy.”50 Ideally, India’s Hindu majority 
notwithstanding, every religion and ethnicity would be treated equally within the 
construct of the state. The INC ran on this platform and projected itself as a secular party 
composed of members of “all major ethnic groups of India.”51 Congress thoroughly 
promoted the idea of an interreligious India.52 Congress, however, also stood to benefit 
from characterizing itself in such a manner. Scholars argue that because of the political 
advantages it provided, the INC painted itself as the sole secular, modern leader of 
peace.53 It went as far as framing other political groups with religious affiliations (such as 
the Muslim League (ML) and Hindu nationalists) as “communal” and “emotional.”54  
Despite the INC’s promises, the risk of Muslim underrepresentation in this 
“interreligious” India was a real threat to the ML. In an attempt to force the development 
of equal representation for Muslims within India, Mohammed Ali Jinnah supported the 
two-nation theory whereby a separate nation for Muslims would be established if equal 
                                                 
50 T. V. Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An 
Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 75. 
53 Ayesha Jalal, “Nation, Reason and Religion: Punjab's Role in the Partition of India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 33, no. 32 (August 8–14, 1998): 2183. 
54 Ibid. 
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representation could not be worked out.55 Ayesha Jalal asserts that this theory was truly 
meant as a preposterous ultimatum whose aim was to force the INC to the table for real 
negotiation.56 The INC, however, saw the two-nation theory differently.  
The so-called demand for Pakistan offered the INC two main electoral 
advantages. First, it supported the INC’s characterization of communal-based parties—
and those parties’ demands—as irrational, “emotional” movements and left the INC as 
the sole legitimate leader of peace under modern, rational terms.57 This characterization 
effectively discredited other communal political movements nationally as irrational and 
“narrow-minded.”58 Second, the INC realized that with the clock ticking, satisfying ML 
demands for Pakistan allowed a transfer of power to a “strong [Congress-led] center” that 
might not exist if a compromise were struck with the ML and India remained unified.59 
Thus, the INC eliminated the competition by “allowing” the ML to depart unified India. 
Ironically, the INC conceded to the communal demands set forth by the ML. A truly 
secular INC might have challenged a division of unified India based on communal 
demands, demonstrating whole-hearted Muslim-protecting provisions to the ML and 
assuring Muslims that a unified Indian government was indifferent to religion. Instead, 
the INC saw the electoral advantages of the satisfaction of the ML demands for Pakistan 
and acquiesced. 
2. Development of Indian Constitution with Consociational Elements 
Following the partition, the INC set out to create the democratic state it had 
promised. It started by electing Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, a member of the 
untouchable caste and a symbolic tribute to equality, to draft the Indian Constitution.60 
The preamble of the Constitution of India promised to secure the Nehruvian ideals of 
                                                 
55 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Kindle edition, 
chap. 2. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Jalal, “Nation, Reason and Religion,” 2183. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, chap. 2. 
60 Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 324, 375. 
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justice, liberty, and equality and to promote fraternity amongst India’s citizens.61 By 
January 26, 1950, India’s new constitution granted unprecedented rights and protections 
to previously invisible members of the population. The constitution abolished 
untouchability, immediately recognizing nearly 60 million new citizens of India.62 Five 
years later India passed the Untouchability (Offences) Act, defining the punishments for 
“continued . . . discrimination against” untouchables.63 Furthermore, recognizing India’s 
largest minority, the new constitution enfranchised 50 percent of its population by 
granting citizenship to women.64 Laws ranging from the Marriage Validation Act of 1949 
to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 now guaranteed Indian women’s rights.  
Examination of the new Indian laws from a consociational perspective reveals 
that Nehru and the INC built in consociational tenets of cultural autonomy and 
proportional representation. The implementation of Muslim Civil Law and earnest 
attempts by the national government to protect and recognize linguistically distinct 
groups in Jammu, Kashmir, and other regions provided for cultural autonomy.65 To 
address colonial entitlement issues, the British produced a Muslim Civil Law based 
generally on Shariat law, thus enacting the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application 
Act or Act XXVI of the Government of India Act, 1935.66 With the passing of the Indian 
Constitution, Article 44 of the constitution further legitimized the existing Muslim 
Personal Law by giving it legal sanction.67 Critics of the law have pointed out that 
Muslim Personal Law was only loosely based on Shariat Law and that the law and 
Article 44 are limited in scope since they only address “marriage, divorce, infants, 
                                                 
61 Government of India, Government: Constitution of India, 
http://india.gov.in/govt/constitutions_india.php. 
62 Wolpert, A New History of India, 385. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 386. 
65 Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” 260–261. 
66 Razia Patel, “Indian Muslim Women, Politics of Muslim Personal Law and Struggle for Life with 
Dignity and Justice,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 44 (October 31–November 6, 2009): 45, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663732.  
67 Ibid,” 46.  
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adoption of minors, intestacy of wills, successions, joint family and partitions.”68 Muslim 
Personal Law does not address criminal activity.69 Despite the ongoing debate, Muslim 
Personal Law can be categorized as a thoroughly entrenched tool of consociational theory 
within India and its constitution.  
Additionally, Nehru and the INC implemented the consociational tenet of 
proportional representation through the use of the reservation system.70 This system 
ensured that “proportional shares of parliamentary representation” were “reserved” only 
for candidates of aboriginal or lower-caste origin.71 Although imperfect, the system 
attempted to offer representation to groups that might not otherwise have any 
representation at all. India’s new constitution, therefore, aspired to enfranchise large 
portions of India’s previously unrecognized population through democratic and 
consociational ideals. 
3. Nehru’s Secularism Policy 
Having established the country’s democratic constitution, Nehru and the INC 
pursued their promise of secularism. Nehru articulates his intolerance of communal 
groups in a May 1948 letter to the Chief Ministers for States: “We have stated that we 
will not recognize or encourage in any way any communal organization which has 
political ends.”72 He enforced secular politics by framing calls for identity politics as 
regional and national linguistic movements. The clearest example of this was how he 
dealt with the ethnic politics of the Punjabi Suba movement led by Master Tara Singh in 
October 1961. When Master Tara Singh and his followers in the Akali Dal made 
demands for a separate Sikh state based on religion, Nehru refused to recognize 
communal demands and instead worked with other Sikh leaders who utilized 
                                                 
68 Michael R Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India,” Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws, London, Occasional paper No 7 (June 1996): 269, quoted in in Razia Patel, “Indian 
Muslim Women,” 45. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” 261. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Rajgopal, Communal Violence in India, 119. 
 18
noncommunal strategies.73 Nehru backed Master Tara Singh’s successor, Sant Fateh 
Singh, who having taken note of Nehru’s refusal to negotiate Master Tara Singh’s 
communal demands, removed all “communal associations” from his demands for the 
Punjabi Suba.74 Sant Fateh Singh demanded a Punjabi state strictly based on linguistic 
lines and was ultimately successful in achieving the separate state of Punjab in 1966.75 
Paul Brass asserts that Nehru’s central government understood the importance of 
allowing the development of regional identities so as not to stifle its maturation as a 
“multi-national state.”76 Granting Punjab statehood based on language allowed for the 
unification of this region under a language spoken by people of several faiths. Nehru not 
only was able to preserve cultural autonomy for Punjab, from a consociational 
perspective, but also was able to create a secular compromise with what began as a 
communal demand.  
Although secular rule of Jammu and Kashmir would be complicated by issues of 
state independence, Nehru articulated his desire for that secular rule through his support 
of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and his secular party, the All-Jammu and Kashmir 
National Conference.77 Nehru and Abdullah met in 1938, just after the formation of the 
National Conference, and immediately recognized their common beliefs in secularism.78 
In October of 1947, immediately “following the accession treaty between Maharaja Hari 
Singh” and the government of India, Nehru asked Abdullah to head the “emergency 
                                                 
73 Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1974), 17, 316–317. 
74 Ibid., 17, 317; Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 80–81. 
75 Harbir Singh, "Sant Fateh Singh's Role in the Creation of Punjabi Suba" in Encyclopaedia of India 
and Her States 4, edited by Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 
1996), 414–432 quoted in Bhupinder Singh, “Politics of Factionalism in Punjab: A Critical Study of 
Shiromani Akali Dal,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 67, no. 4 (October–December 2006): 841–
842, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856267. Wolpert, A New History of India, 400. 
76 Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, 16. 
77 Ramachandra Guha, “Opening a Window in Kashmir,” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 35 
(August 28–September 3, 2004): 3905–3906, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415473. Wolpert, A New History 
of India, 372.  
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administration” of Jammu and Kashmir.79 Rather than requesting that the communally 
tainted Maharaja lead the newly formed state, Nehru requested the leadership of the 
secular Sheikh, and both men signed the Delhi Agreement in 1952.80 This agreement was 
short-lived. Calls from Hindu nationalists in Jammu for the elimination of Article 370 
and the Delhi Agreement provoked statements of Kashmiri independence from 
Abdullah.81 Within a year’s time Abdullah was jailed on accusations that he was 
“plotting to break up the Indian union,” by advocating for Jammu and Kashmiri 
independence.82 Therefore, India deftly eliminated threats of Kashmiri secession because 
of the pride it took in its secularism policy and ability to accommodate multiple 
religions..  
The case for the consociational preservation of cultural autonomy in Kashmir is 
weaker than that of the Punjab example. Nehru found that cultural autonomy in Kashmir 
quickly devolved into full-blown calls for independence, which, as mentioned earlier, 
was highly unacceptable for India. The complex and manipulative situation in Jammu 
and Kashmir aside, Nehru’s initial support of Abdullah indicated his desire for secular 
leadership in Jammu and Kashmir.83 
4. Nehru’s Economic Vision 
Nehru, a modernist, deeply believed that the secular implementation of economic 
reforms for the alleviation of poverty would relieve tension over minority and communal 
                                                 
79 Reeta Chowdhari-Tremblay, “Responses to the Parliamentary and Assembly Elections in Kashmir’s 
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issues.84 Even before India’s independence, Nehru argued that the resolution of Muslim 
economic problems spoke louder than communal issues, prompting Congress to adopt 
this platform for gaining Muslim support in the 1946 elections.85 Nehru recognized that 
poverty was a problem that affected all Indians, regardless of religion.86  
Once in office, Nehru moved forward with an economic development plan based 
on “a mixed economy in which the state would take responsibility for the provision of 
infrastructure as well as large and heavy industrial investment.”87 This economic model 
would allow the government to play a main role “not only in redistribution and reduction 
in poverty, but in providing a pattern of growth which would provide for a diversified 
industrial economy catering to mass consumption needs as well as mitigate the usual 
market failures.”88 To accomplish this, Nehru immediately enacted the first of his three 
economic plans called the Five Year Plans. The plans focused on the buildup of 
nationalized industry and aimed to create jobs for the Indian people in hopes of 
establishing stability for India’s new economy.89 Taking advantage of the share of 
industrial assets that the partition had bestowed upon the newly formed India, Nehru’s 
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 defined India’s national industrialization 
path.90 He envisioned an India more capable of equitably sharing its wealth and therefore 
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better able to erase class distinctions amongst its people.91 With class distinctions 
“erased,” he hoped communal differences, which were often highlighted in situations of 
grave economic disparity, would follow suit.92  
However, the fruits of Nehru’s economic plan failed to reach the poor. Between 
1950 and 1964, the Indian economy grew on average 3.7 percent.93 Since this growth was 
mainly “concentrated in heavy industry,” it “barely benefited” the poor, who were (and 
still remain) widely “dependen[t] on agriculture.”94 But the nation was patient. Nehru’s 
economic development plan bore modest results in the form of increased agricultural and 
industrial growth rates when compared with colonial levels, and actually increased 
“industrial diversification” and “national self-reliance” in food production.95 Nehru’s 
strict adherence to secular politics kept communal tensions to a minimum and 
compensated for his failed attempt to lower tensions economically. 
5. Hindu-Muslim Violence during the Nehruvian Era: 1950–197696  
This section argues that consociational democracy and the lack of significant 
Hindu nationalist communal politics led to low levels of Hindu-Muslim violence for 
nearly 30 years after independence. The combined terms of Nehru and his immediate 
successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, spanned almost three decades during 
which all three leaders faced minimal incidents of Hindu-Muslim violence (see Figure 1). 
From a consociational standpoint, the Congress system was a system of consensus, or 
grand coalition where the INC acted as the primary broker of consensus for a consensual 
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democracy.97 The Consociational Nehruvian tradition ensured the needs of “all main 
religious, linguistic and regional groups” were satisfied to a point that it kept intergroup 
violence, specifically, Hindu-Muslim violence levels relatively low98 (see Figure 1). 
During this 27-year period, India witnessed 7.22 deaths a year due to Hindu-Muslim 
violence.  
 
Note: Figure compiled with data from the following sources: Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-
Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 8, 2004; Election Data from government of India Election 
Commission of India, Poll Dates of 14 Lok Sabha Elections, access date September 8, 2014, 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/poll_dates_of_loksabha_elc.aspx. 
Figure 1.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence Across India 
(National Parliamentary Election Years Annotated): 1950–1995  
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Post-independence, the Hindu nationalist communal political party, the Bharatiya 
Jana Sangh (BJS) and the Janata Party (JP), the BJP’s predecessors, did not enjoy a wide 
political following (see Table 1).99 Stanley Wolpert asserts these opposition parties were 
simply unable to confront the INC with any “real issues.”100 The majority of Indians 
were interested in the programs Nehru and the INC offered for the strengthening of the 
new state and the alleviation of poverty. The INC enjoyed single-party domination for the 
first 30 years after India gained independence, enabling the execution of its secular 
policies and bolstering its ties to minority groups. Therefore, the system of consensus that 
the INC was able to maintain coupled with its domination of the political scene draws out 
the causal relationship between the INCs strong organizational presence and low Hindu-
Muslim violence. 
Table 1. Performance of the Jana Sangh and the BJP in Lok Sabha in Kerala,  
Uttar Pradesh and India Overall, 1952–2009 
 
Note: Table compiled with data from the following sources: The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India by 
Christophe Jaffrelot Appendix D for 1952–1991 data; 1996–2009 election data from Election Commission 






                                                 
99 The BJS, JP and the BJP are political party offshoots of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 
the Association of National Volunteers. The RSS is a Hindu revivalist group founded in 1925. For details 
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100 Wolpert, A New History of India, 382. 
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009
BJS BJS BJS BJS BJS JP JP BJP BJP BJP BJP BJP BJP BJP BJP
Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%) Seats (%)
Kerala -- -- 0 (0.7) 0 (1.4) 0 (1.4) 2 (39.9) 1 (22.9) 0 (1.8) 0 (4.5) 0 (4.6) 0 (5.61) 0 (8.0) 0 (6.6) 0 (10.4) 0 (6.31)
Uttar Pradesh 0 (7.3) 2 (14.8) 7 (17.6) 12 (22.2) 4 (12.3) 85 (68.1) 3 (22.6) 0 (6.4) 8 (7.6) 50 (32.8) 52 (33.4) 57 (36.5) 29 (27.6) 10 (22.2) 10 (17.5)
India Total 3 (3.1) 4 (5.9) 14 (6.4) 35 (9.4) 22 (7.4) 294 (41.3) 31 (19) 2 (7.4) 85 (11.4) 119 (20.1) 161 (20.3) 182 (25.6) 182 (23.8) 138 (22.2) 116 (18.8)
PERFORMANCE OF THE JANA SANGH AND THE B.J.P. IN LOK SABHA ELECTIONS IN KERALA, UTTAR PRADESH AND INDIA OVERALL       
1952 TO 2009                                                                                                                        
(SEATS WON AND SHARE OF VALID VOTES)
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B. DECAY OF CONSOCIATIONAL NEHRUVIAN TRADITION AND 
INCREASED HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE 
The section examines the shifted secular and economic policies under Indira and 
Rajiv Gandhi and the consequent Hindu-Muslim violence between 1977 and 1990. 
1. Shifted Secularism Policies under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 
India witnessed the first major departures from the Nehruvian tradition and the 
INC’s consociational construct during Indira Gandhi’s second term as prime minister. 
With the precedent set, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, followed suit. “Mrs. Gandhi had a 
patrimonial view of Indian politics. She saw the political system as a kind of estate she 
inherited from her father, which she believed should be transmitted to her heirs.”101 Her 
desire to maintain power within familial lines caused Indira to tighten her grip and thus 
restrict the system that was in existence.102 Thus, as Lijphart identifies, the consociational 
system set in place by Nehru and the INC gave way to a “centralized and hierarchical” 
system under Indira.103 This centralization led to Indira’s first breaches of the INC’s 
secular policy, her interactions with communal political factions in both Punjab and 
Kashmir. Recognizing the communal demands of these groups legitimized their presence 
in the political sphere and thus opened national politics to communal discourse, 
beginning a cycle of communal concessions.104 Rajiv Gandhi would mirror his mother’s 
example in his handling of the Shah Bano case and the Rama Janmabhoomi movement.  
Indira Gandhi’s break with Nehruvian secularism in her late-1970s’ recognition of 
Tarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh religious fundamentalist leader, legitimized 
Bhindranwale’s religious demands and the role he was attempting to assume within the 
government.105 The relationship initially offered Indira and the regional INC an 
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opportunity to undermine the competition that the Akali Dal posed to Congress in Punjab 
by pitting factions of the Dal against each other and endorsing Bhindranwale’s Sikh 
fundamentalist group, the Damdami Taksa.106 In turn, Indira and the INC tolerated the 
Damdami Taksa’s activities in support of the movement for a separate Sikh state, 
“Khalistan.”107 Her support of Damdami Taksa clearly broke with the secular precedent 
set by Nehru.108 Indira’s negotiations with the Sikh extremists “oscillated between 
accommodation and obduracy” as Bhindranwale’s group grew increasingly violent in its 
movement for a sovereign Sikh state.109 Now considered a “legitimized” political actor, 
Bhindranwale’s rhetoric spiraled out of control as he continued on the Damdami Taksa’s 
agenda for the establishment of a sovereign Sikh state.110 Bhindranwale’s rhetoric and 
Damdami Taksa’s agenda quickly soured the alliance.111 The situation to this point 
convinced Indira that the Sikh fundamentalist agenda no longer suited her interests, and 
she attempted to have Bhindranwale eliminated. Sikh moderates immediately saw 
through Indira’s political tactics in Punjab and disapproved of her use of their 
community’s political landscape at their expense. The nation witnessed these events 
unfolding and clearly understood that cleavages within religious minority groups would 
be exploited if gains were to be made by Indira and the INC. Indira veered from her 
father’s secular path by accommodating religious demands; now her only recourse was to 
control the situation with violence. Bhindranwale based his fundamentalist group out of 
the most holy Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab. The culmination of 
events came with Operation Blue Star, when, in June of 1984, Indira ordered the 
storming of the Golden Temple and the elimination of Bhindranwale’s movement. As a 
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direct result of her having commanded Operation Blue Star, Indira’s Sikh bodyguards 
assassinated her six months later. James Manor’s observation that “it is dangerous folly to 
play politics with religious sentiments,” certainly applies to the way in which the political 
situation in Punjab was handled.112 His quote applies not only to the ultimate price paid 
by Indira but also to the invitation of religious fundamentalism into the political realm. 
Her handling of the Sikh communal demands was the first major breach with Nehruvian 
secularism, and it set a precedent for the state’s manipulation of religious groups for 
political gains. As Nehru had believed, the modern Indian political construct would not 
logically accommodate religious demands without opening the floodgates to communal 
politics.  
Indira’s meddling in Jammu and Kashmir provides an additional example of her 
departure from Nehruvian secularism. In 1975, in exchange for the position of Chief 
Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah dropped his demand for a plebiscite 
and accepted the status quo regarding the measures being used to better integrate Jammu 
and Kashmir with India, which had been put in place after his incarceration in 1953.113 
Despite the criticism Abdullah received for entering into agreement with Indira Gandhi, 
Abdullah and the National Congress remained formidable political competition versus the 
INC in Jammu and Kashmir, as demonstrated in the National Conference’s performance 
in the 1977 elections.114 After Abdullah’s death, in an effort to undermine continued 
competition during the 1983 elections, Indira aligned the INC with Hindu nationalist 
parties in Jammu.115 “Mrs. Gandhi appealed explicitly to communal sentiments among 
Hindu voters in Jammu (the Hindu-chauvinists) accusing the Conference…of harbouring 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 95. 
113 David E. Lockwood, “Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah's Reinstatement,” The World Today 31, no. 6 
(June, 1975): 251, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394860. For more detail on the “integrative measures” 
implemented in Jammu and Kashmir during Sheikh Abdullah’s incarceration, see James Manor, “Center-
state Relations,” 95–97. 
114 Manor, “Center-State Relations,” 96. 
115 Sumantra Bose, “’Hindu Nationalism’ and the Crisis of the Indian State: A Theoretical 
Perspective,” in Nationalism , Democracy and Development, ed. by Suguta Bose and Ayesha Jalal (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 121. 
 27
‘anti-national’ and ‘pro-Pakistani’ inclinations.”116 As she had in the Punjab, Indira’s 
recognition of the communal feelings of the Hindu nationalist group legitimized their 
place in the political space. In effect, Indira’s advocacy of the Hindu nationalist 
movement in Kashmir gave “a saffron colouring to the politics of the state,” and 
completely violated Nehruvian secularism.117  
Rajiv Gandhi’s term as prime minister also brought about further secular 
violations. Rajiv’s most prominent violation of Nehruvian secularism was the 1980s Shah 
Bano case, whose cascading effects led to the state recognition of Muslim civil law 
(Shariat law) over national civil law, and the opening of the Babri Mosque exclusively to 
Hindus.118 These combined events cost the INC legitimacy in the eyes of the Indian 
people and ultimately justified the entrance of the major communal political party, the 
BJP, onto the Indian political landscape.119  
Rajiv Gandhi opened a Pandora’s box of religious appeasements in the political 
realm when he rescinded his support of the Supreme Court’s April 1985 ruling on the 
Shah Bano case, which upheld secular law.120 Shah Bano was a Muslim woman who 
filed for alimony under the Indian state’s Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 125, after 
her husband filed for divorce.121 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Shah Bano, 
mandating that her husband pay alimony despite Muslim civil law stating otherwise.122 
Rajiv Gandhi initially supported that decision.123 This ruling, in the eyes of the Muslim 
leadership in India, was an affront to Islam in that it denigrated the application of Muslim 
personal law. Several months later, facing pressure from Muslim politicians and 
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widespread Muslim protests, Rajiv rescinded his support of secular law prevailing over 
personal law and allowed for the passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill in February of 1986.124 This bill upheld Muslim personal law by affirming 
that a Muslim man was only obligated to pay alimony for the iddat period, a period of 
approximately three months after the divorce.125 Other Muslim regulations upheld in the 
bill included the obligation of the woman to care for the children produced by the 
marriage and the arrangement of long-term maintenance of the woman in the event that 
“she had no relatives to care for her” after divorce.126 Christophe Jaffrelot asserts that 
Rajiv’s change of support was his attempt to prevent the alienation of Muslim political 
leaders and certainly the Muslim population altogether.127 However, having made 
concessions to the Muslim community of India, Rajiv now felt obligated to do the same 
for the Hindu community.128 Facing Hindu nationalist pressure over the state’s 
accommodation of Muslim law, in 1986 Rajiv Gandhi decided to reopen the Babri 
Mosque to Hindu pilgrims and worshippers and in 1989 approved plans for the pouring 
of the foundation for the Rama Janmabhoomi Temple adjacent to the Babri Mosque.129 
This decision alienated Muslims who also sought access to the Babri mosque because of 
its historical significance for Muslim-Indians.130 Far from Nehru’s vision for a secular 
state, deviations in secular law at the hands of both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi had become 
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legitimized common practice in India, in effect creating space for the entrance of the 
communal politics of the BJP. 
The organizational decay of the INC between 1977 and 1995 while under the 
leadership of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi occurred concurrently with the weakening of the 
consociational democracy put in place by Nehru.131 This decay contributed to the 
attraction of the alternative representation of the BJP. Indira Gandhi took the delicately 
balanced system of consensus she inherited from her father and in an effort to preserve it, 
clamped down on her power, thus centralizing the system.132 To maintain and exert this 
power, though, she and her son required the forging of alliances with communal groups 
not traditionally sought out by Nehru and the INC. These alliances legitimized the 
communal demands of previously discredited groups such as the Hindu nationalists.133 
Now politically legitimized, these groups began demanding the abolition of critical 
aspects of the consociational democracy put in place by Nehru, such as the special 
power-sharing compromises preserved under cultural autonomy.134 This shift away from 
consociational democracy ultimately enabled Hindu nationalist political groups to run on 
“fresh” platforms, addressing issues that were previously beyond consideration for the 
INC and thus attracting new followership. 
2. Shifted Economic Policies under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 
Indira Gandhi continued to implement economic policies in line with those of her 
father’s through her first term as prime minister while giving a nod to the International 
Monetary Fund about future liberalization during her second term. During both terms, 
however, she considered all economic policies in terms of the effects they would have on 
her centralization tactics and her desire to maintain power.135 
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During her first term, Indira Gandhi faced challenges that would eventually erode 
hers and the INC’s popularity. Indira’s June 1966 devaluation of the rupee signaled to 
opposition parties and the country alike that the economic policies put in place by Nehru 
and the INC were unsuccessful.136 Despite the steady yet modest growth the previous 
three Five-Year Plans had produced, this demoralizing blow was proof, for the 
opposition, that Congress’s plans were deficient.137 Confidence in the INC’s economic 
plans was immediately lost and opposition platforms, such as those of the BJS, who had 
recently begun consolidating with other opposition parties in 1964, were strengthened.138 
As a result, the INC nearly lost the 1967 elections, winning only by a slim majority.139 
This close election was indicative of the unprecedented mounting opposition Congress 
faced at the time. With hers and Congress’s popularity dwindling, Indira Gandhi 
announced vigorous economic reforms in July of 1969 in an attempt to appeal to the poor 
masses and to refocus India on her father’s economic reforms for the alleviation of 
poverty.140  
While overall success of agricultural reforms and the Green Revolution reflected 
well on Indira Gandhi, the uneven distribution of the benefits of these programs would 
undermine India’s economic development overall and cause unrest later on. Indira’s 
agricultural reforms included state- and national-level increases in agricultural spending 
to improve food production.141 The Green Revolution introduced new high-yield food-
grain varieties and seed-fertilizer technology and mechanization, which boosted 
agricultural production significantly.142 These programs reaped tremendous benefits for 
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the elevation of lower castes and peasants overall. In the case of Punjab, often described 
as India’s “breadbasket,” the upper and middle class landowning peasants were the 
primary beneficiaries of the Green Revolution.143 In moves to advance their paths to 
wealth and to deal with the political challenges that the poor landless lower classes and 
castes posed, these newly rich landowners sought more political power.144 The new 
reforms had created greater access to loans, which solidified the institutional participation 
of these groups.145 Indira Gandhi and the INC had empowered lower caste landowners 
and peasants, winning their support of the INC at the cost of displacing upper middle 
caste groups. This alienation would eventually manifest itself during Indira’s son’s term 
as prime minister. 
Rajiv Gandhi recognized the need to take the next step for India’s economic 
development, and he deliberately moved away from the widespread industrial 
nationalization policies of Nehru and Indira Gandhi.146 In 1986, he began to implement 
economic policies aimed at the deregulation and liberalization of electronics industries in 
India. Rajiv’s new reforms opened India’s economy to capital investment in private 
industries.147 These reforms, therefore, first benefited the affluent upper castes that had 
the ready capital for immediate investment into these new markets. Relaxed licensing and 
tariff rules facilitated the rapid rise of wealth among these already affluent castes.148 
Immediately Rajiv Gandhi’s reforms were perceived as “pro-rich.”149 With this 
perception, upper middle caste Hindus, feeling that their small businesses and industries 
were no longer protected, dropped their support of the INC. They found the economic 
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protections promoted under the BJP more in line with their needs because the BJP’s 
“swadeshi approach to economic development,” emphasized “nationalist consumption” 
and rejected the entrance of multinational corporations into India.150 These losses, 
compounded with the displacement felt during Indira Gandhi’s first prime ministerial 
term, sufficiently convinced the Hindu upper middle castes that the INC would not 
support economic policies in line with protecting their economic interests. Effectively 
economically marginalized, the Hindu upper middle caste provided a population base for 
the popular growth of the Hindu nationalist political party, the BJP. Thus, the stage was 
set for the entrance of the BJP’s economic policies. 
3. Hindu-Muslim Violence during INC’s Organizational Decay: 1977– 
1995  
This section argues that for the 1977–1995 period, Hindu-Muslim violence 
incidents increased because of a weakening of the consociational democracy and the 
subsequent legitimization of Hindu nationalist political representation at the national 
level. Lijphart asserts that after the late 1960s in India, “the weakening of power sharing 
[was] . . . accompanied by an increase in intergroup hostility and violence.”151 
Specifically referencing Hindu-Muslim violence, intergroup violence increased because 
groups previously able to share power under consociational tenets were no longer able to 
find compromise and therefore resorted to violence. As the political environment became 
more communally charged, intergroup violence increased. During this 19-year period, 
India witnessed 23.16 deaths a year because of Hindu-Muslim violence, which 
constitutes 3.2 times as many deaths when compared with the 1950–1976 period 
discussed earlier. This is a small number in a country as populous as India, but an 
increase nonetheless. Figure 1 depicts the increase in Hindu-Muslim incidents of 
violence, with spikes in 1979, 1981, 1989, 1992, and 1993. These spikes are discussed in 
the next section. The next section also discusses how Hindu nationalist political parties, 
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now emboldened by the legitimization of their demands at the national level, utilized 
Hindu-Muslim violence as a vehicle for recruitment.  
C. THE BJP: A “NEW” ALTERNATIVE 
The BJP took advantage of Congress’s inconsistent secular policy that now 
recognized religious groups’ grievances in the political realm and thus legitimized their 
existence in the political space. With a legitimized communal platform, BJP was able to 
mobilize support by focusing on Hindu nationalism. The BJP’s mobilization along 
religious lines created an environment conducive to religious conflict and competition, 
which subsequently led to increases in Hindu-Muslim violence. This section discusses the 
origins of Hindu nationalism and the BJP. 
Hindu nationalism’s roots lie in the British colonial period when the revivalist 
movement that aimed at “resurrect[ing] cultural pride” began to emerge.152 In 1925 K. B. 
Hedgewar created the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which has since become the 
main component of the Hindu nationalist movement.153 The RSS is a militant Hindu 
nationalist organization “dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmans.”154 The group draws its 
inspiration for its militant traditions from its heritage “of the Maratha war bands.”155 The 
Hindu nationalist movement has evolved into the Sangh Parivar, a family of associations 
of Hindu nationalist groups that consolidated in the 1960s. 
After independence, the RSS decided to diversify its “affiliated organizations 
within different sectors and institutions of Indian society as a means of infusing Hindu 
nationalist values into public life.”156 By doing that, it began to create branch 
organizations for greater reach into religious life, youth activities, and politics. The 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) is the religious branch of the RSS. To make the religion 
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of Hinduism more accessible, the VHP was charged with creating an easy-to-understand 
set of common Hindu symbols for wider appeal.157 Likewise, the Bajrang Dal is the 
VHP’s militant youth wing whose aim is to indoctrinate young people into the RSS.158 
The political branch of the RSS started as the BJS, also known as the Jana Sangh. S. P. 
Mookerjee started the group in 1951 with the support of pracharaks (full-time RSS 
propagandists) and other politicians in opposition to Nehru’s “pro-Pakistan” stance.159 
The party initially supported mildly anti-Islamic positions such as “support of cow 
protections, . . . advocacy of Hindi as the country’s official language, and opposition to 
Urdu,” among other issues.160 The Jana Sangh’s economic platform consisted of the 
promotion of small business merchants, middle peasants, and “urbanized lower middle 
class.”161 Until 1977 the Jana Sangh enjoyed very little political representation at the 
national level (see Table 1). However, in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s 1975–1977 
Emergency Rule, “the Jana Sangh played an important role in forming the Janata party in 
1977,” the coalition of political parties in opposition to Indira and the INC.162 In three 
years, once the Janata party began to disintegrate, the BJP was formed.163 Today the BJP 
is the most recent iteration of the RSS’s political arm.  
Recognizing the window of opportunity created by Congress’s imperfect 
execution of its self-imposed secular policies and economic reforms, the BJP was able to 
develop a credible political platform as an alternative political choice for those recently 
disillusioned with INC representation.164 Hoping to appeal to the Hindu majority, the 
main thrust of the BJP’s political agenda lay in the acceptance of Hinduism as the sole 
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source of India’s identity.165 Therefore, in order to create a unified “Indian nation,” 
India’s Muslims, India’s largest minority, were targeted for submission to Hindu 
nationalist tenets.166 Varshney identifies these tenets as the following: 
1) Accept the centrality of Hinduism to Indian civilization; 2) 
Acknowledge key Hindu figures such as Ram as civilization heroes, and 
not regard them as mere religious figures of Hinduism; 3) Accept that 
Muslim rulers in various parts of India (between roughly 1000 to 1857) 
destroyed the pillars of Hindu civilization, especially Hindu Temples; and 
4) Make no claims to special privileges such as the maintenance of 
religious personal laws, nor demand special state grants for their 
educational institutions.167 
Hindu nationalists believe that only through the acknowledgement of these tenets 
will Muslims be fully assimilated into the Indian nation.168 Those unwilling to 
acknowledge the tenets were therefore denying Indian unity and were to be excluded.169 
Looking to gain political support from the Hindu majority, the BJP embarked on a plan 
that politicized religious symbols as a means of recruiting followers.  
1. Use of Hindu Symbols to Mobilize Followers 
The most prominent examples of the BJP’s politicization of religious symbols are 
the emphasis placed on Hindu religious processions knows as yatras, or journeys, and the 
Ram Janmabhoomi movement, whose ultimate goal was the destruction of the Babri 
Mosque in order to build a temple dedicated to the Hindu god Ram.170 The combined 
effects of the politicization of these symbols resulted in increases in Hindu-Muslim 
violence beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the early 1990s. The “waves of 
violence” left in the wake of these public displays of Hindu nationalist sentiment 
demonstrate the power of mobilization along religious lines.  
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The Sangh Parivar utilized yatras to gain support for the Hindu nationalist 
movement. Beginning in 1982 and 1983, the VHP successfully organized several yatras 
in South India to rally support.171 Two prime examples of yatras were the processions 
known as the Ram Shila Pujan held in 1989 and the Rath Yatra held in 1990. The goal of 
the Ram Shila Pujan was to collect consecrated bricks from across India for the 
reconstruction of the Ram temple at Ayodhya, thus “liberating” Ram from Babri 
domination.172 This procession began in Bihar, ended at the mosque in Ayodhya, and 
was successful in consecrating several hundred thousands of bricks from all across India 
and from Hindus around the world.173 See Figure 2 for a depiction of the death intensity 
per Hindu-Muslim violence incident by state for the year of 1989, the year the Ram Shila 
Pujan yatra took place. Figure 2 indicates that Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh 
experienced the most intense events of Hindu-Muslim violence that year. Bihar was the 
starting point of the Ram Shila Pujan and the location of the Bhagalpur riots.174 The 
Bhagalpur riots sparked similar violence across all India.175 This VHP-organized event, 
in which the BJP actively participated, incited increased levels of Hindu-Muslim violence 
in Bihar in 1989. The commission for the investigation of the Bhagalpur riots blamed the 
BJP for its active involvement in the riots and its incitement of Hindu-Muslim violence. 
The BJP was therefore an active proponent of the incitement of Hindu-Muslim violence. 
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Note: Data from the Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 
8, 2004. 
Figure 2.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence by State: 
1989 Year of Ram Shila Pujan. 
The same can be shown for the Rath Yatra procession led by then president of the 
BJP, L. K. Advani in 1990.176 Advani’s Rath Yatra was a pilgrimage that traversed the 
states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Delhi until its abrupt end in Bihar.177 Its 
aim was to conduct a procession from Gujarat to Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, recruiting 
Hindu nationalist kar sevaks (religious workers) along the way. The BJP designed the 
yatra as a national-level demonstration and hoped for extensive media coverage for the  
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wider dissemination of the purpose of the event.178 Again, the Varshney-Wilkinson 
dataset shows that some of the states through which the Rath Yatra passed experienced 
some of the most intense Hindu-Muslim violence that year (see Figure 3).179  
 
Note: Data from the Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 
8, 2004. 
Figure 3.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence by State: 
1990 Year of Rath Yatra. 
Both these processions, as planned, demonstrated the domination of Hindus in the 
public space of India.180 Subsequently, both events successfully incited Hindu-Muslim 
violence.181 The advocacy and participation of the BJP in both yatras indicates that yatras 
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were a preferred method of Hindu recruitment and Muslim intimidation. These yatras set 
prime conditions for the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. 
The Ram Janmabhoomi movement was a similar precession-type event based on 
the belief that the Babri Mosque had been built on top of the birthplace of the premier 
Hindu god, Ram. The belief was that Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, had 
destroyed the original Hindu temple that marked the birthplace of Ram and subsequently 
built a mosque in its place. The Hindu nationalist argument, in line with its call for the 
recognition and rectification of past Muslim destruction of Hindu temples, demanded the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque in order to rebuild Ram’s temple for the Hindu majority. 
This movement culminated on December 8, 1992, when thousands of kar sevaks 
descended on the Babri Mosque and destroyed it. This event set off waves of violence 
between Hindus and Muslims throughout all of India. Figure 1 depicts the peak of Hindu-
Muslim violence that India experienced in 1992. Because of the BJP’s recent electoral 
gains, discussed in the next section, the BJP remained a quiet supporter of the Ram 
Janmabhoomi movement.182 Jaffrelot explains that its support to the movement was more 
readily apparent at the local and regional levels.183 Overall, however, the BJP’s 
association with the Ram Janmabhoomi movement and the Hindu-Muslim violence it 
incited was widely acknowledged if not outright publicized. 
2. BJP Use of Communal Violence and Riots 
The communal riot is the most violent form of expression between communal 
groups and often signifies the utter devolution of communication between opposing 
groups. Smaller, spontaneous communal violence incidents may provoke the onset of a 
full-blown communal riot, but scholars have found that communal riots more often than 
not are planned events. In this context the BJP has utilized communal riots in India. Brass 
asserts that the BJP utilized mobilization along communal lines to empower the political 
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party in India.184 Therefore, the BJP’s use of communal violence and riots, pitting the 
Hindu majority against the Muslim minority, served to further its agenda. Engineer 
asserts that communal parties (read the BJP) can exploit small incidents of communal 
violence for inciting full-scale riots.185 Calling attention to smaller events, communal 
parties can justify larger, more devastating riots. Therefore, scholars generally accepted 
that the communal riot itself is a constructed event, “requir[ing] previous planning and 
provision of infrastructure.”186 Both Engineer and Brass assert that no large-scale 
communal riot is spontaneous.187 Brass explains that communal riots serve multiple 
purposes, including deliberate affronts, recruiting, and communal messaging.188 Every 
minute aspect of the riot is designed to serve a particular purpose.189  
In the discussion of communal riots in India, the BJP’s interaction with the 
institutional mechanisms for dealing with the riots, particularly the police, is a critical 
piece of the progression of riots. The role of the police must be examined given that they 
are local citizens themselves and usually act as first responders to communal violence 
events. Engineer argues that depending on the goals of communal forces, local police are 
either left to quell the communal violence or encouraged to let it escalate.190 In cases 
where small events trigger a communal riot, oftentimes police are “under pressure not to 
act and to let the violence spread.”191 In either case, communal parties such as the BJP 
are in command of either the escalation or de-escalation of communal riots by 
“pressuring” local police.192 
                                                 
184 Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 6–7. 
185 Asghar Ali Engineer, “Communal Riots, 2004,” Economic and Political Weekly 40 (February 
2005): 520, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416163. 
186 Engineer, “Communal Riots, 2004,” 520. 
187 Ibid.; Paul R. Brass, “Development of an Institutionalised Riot System in Meerut City, 1961 to 
1982,” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (2004): 4839, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415744. 
188 Brass, “Development of an Institutionalised Riot System,” 4839. 
189 Ibid. 




3. The Manipulation of Hindu-Muslim Violence for Electoral Results 
The previous examples show that Hindu nationalists and their primary political 
party, the BJP, utilized Hindu-Muslim violence to promote their agenda and for recruiting 
during the 1980s and 1990s. The entrance of the BJP onto India’s political landscape 
caused India to experience its highest levels of Hindu-Muslim violence since the 1947 
partition. The BJP was first elected to a national-level parliamentary seat in 1984. Figure 
1 depicts the dramatic increase in Hindu-Muslim violence beginning in the 1980s, just 
prior to the 1984 election. While the decades prior show variations, in the 1980s a 
consistent increase in Hindu-Muslim violence occurred. As Figure 1 shows, throughout 
the 1990s a considerable amount of Hindu-Muslim violence ensued. Wilkinson and Basu 
attribute this rise directly to the BJP’s political strategy aimed at mobilizing the majority 
Hindus on an anti-minority platform just prior to the 1991 general elections.193 Wilkinson 
points out that once having captured power, the BJP stops inciting Hindu-Muslim 
violence, which partially accounts for the sharp drop in Hindu-Muslim violence in 1991 
and then again in 1994 and 1995, after the Babri Mosque destruction in 1992.194 
Wilkinson also attributes this drop in violence to the coalition the BJP had entered.195 
The BJP was able to develop alliances with other smaller political parties, which led to 
their capture of the majority in the Lok Sabha (India’s lower parliamentary house) in 
1998 through 2003.196 Many scholars agree that the BJP has moderated its use of Hindu-
Muslim violence because of the emergence of coalition politics in India and the 
subsequent realization of the need to appeal to as many constituents as possible.  
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Finally, the increasingly communal sociopolitical environment created by Indira 
Gandhi and the INC through the recognition and legitimization of communal political 
groups and leaders such as the Akali Dal and Bhindranwale facilitated the advance of the 
BJP. Nehru reframed calls for communal politics as linguistic and regional movements to 
keep clear of any association between political demands and communal groups. He 
separated himself from those associations by maintaining a decentralized INC and 
encouraging regular state INC elections so the local experts could broker the consensual 
governance necessary for a nation as diverse as India.197 Indira Gandhi, on the other 
hand, acknowledged the demands for communal politics, and by negotiating with them, 
legitimized them. Her centralization of the party necessitated this legitimization. A 
communally-charged sociopolitical environment enabled the BJP to justify its communal 
demands and observations, drawing in many more followers than previously possible. 
4. Current Activity 
Scholars today assert that the BJP is moving toward a more centrist political 
platform to ensure its ability to win a broader array of the electorate, as recently 
demonstrated in the overwhelming majority win in 2014.198 The Jana Sangh, the BJP’s 
predecessor, became more centrist and less “anti-Muslim when it came into national 
power in 1977 via a coalition of Congress opposition political parties.”199 Stephen Cohen 
explains that because of the influence of coalition politics, as discussed earlier, the BJP is 
forced to ignore the calls of “its radical elements and Parivar to take extreme [political] 
positions.”200 Overall, India’s political party landscape has seen steep increases in 
coalition politics. Consequently, the BJP has lessened its use of Hindu-Muslim riots 
because of the potential loss of Muslim voters to Congress.201 In a democracy where 
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minute voting margins often dictate political victory, the BJP has had to change its 
methods of mobilization to remain a viable national political party. 
D. CONCLUSION 
At the national level, the decay of the consociational Nehruvian tradition, as 
demonstrated by the practice of inconsistent secular politics as well as structural shifts in 
economic hierarchies, created an opening for the entrance of the BJP onto India’s 
political landscape. By recognizing and appeasing religious groups in a political setting, 
Indira Gandhi and her son set a precedence that legitimized the entrance of religious 
groups with political agendas, namely the BJP. Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and 
then her son, Rajiv, consistent economic reforms favoring lower-caste Hindus caused 
structural shifts among lower- and upper-caste Hindus economically and politically. 
Lower castes now found themselves beneficiaries of increases in central and state 
agricultural spending and subsidies, displacing upper-caste Hindus. Alienated by 
Congress’s economic reforms, these displaced upper-caste Hindus became the population 
base for the Hindu nationalist movement. 
Once an emerging national political party, the BJP chose to use Hindu-Muslim 
violence throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a means of recruitment of Hindus and 
intimidation of the Muslim minority. In stark contrast to Nehruvian principles, the BJP 
sought to legitimize religion and Hindu nationalism in the political realm. 
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III. THE INC’S STATE-LEVEL MONOPOLY OF POWER  
AND ITS EFFECTS ON HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE:  
A COMPARISON OF KERALA AND UTTAR PRADESH 
This chapter compares the states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh based on the INC’s 
monopoly of power in either state, specifically examining the effects this monopoly had 
on the states’ formation of civic institutions and subsequent experience of Hindu-Muslim 
violence. The chapter examines the political landscape and levels of Hindu-Muslim 
violence in each state during the same periods covered in Chapter II; 1950–1976 and 
1977–1995.  
This chapter demonstrates that the INC has never been able to establish or 
maintain a monopoly in the state of Kerala because of the Communist Party’s presence. 
From the outset, the INC has had to form intergroup coalitions with communal political 
parties in Kerala in order to remain competitive. Because of these coalitions, which are in 
essence civic institutions, and the consequent disincentive for communal violence for any 
party’s electoral success, Hindu-Muslim violence has historically remained low in 
Kerala. Conversely, the INC has been successful in establishing a monopoly of power in 
Uttar Pradesh. However, the state has felt the effects of both a healthy and a decayed INC 
organization. True to its secularist platform, from 1950 to 1976 while the INC thrived, 
the INC itself brokered intercommunal grievances within the construct of the state party 
organizations, thus eliminating any need for the building of civic institutions and 
consequently keeping Hindu-Muslim violence relatively low. As the INC’s organization 
decayed, the lack of intercommunal civic institutions coupled with the INC’s inability to 
broker consensus and facilitated the entrance of the Hindu nationalist political party on 




A. INC’S MONOPOLY OF POWER AND HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE: 
1950–1976 
Immediately after partition, the INC was successful in fulfilling a relatively 
centrist platform that appealed to a wide variety of constituents across almost all of India. 
Congress, in all states except for Kerala, was able to maintain its appeal to the masses and 
control internal conflicts by implementing a system utilizing state party organizations.202 
Myron Weiner attributes this ability to the power that Congress state party bosses had 
from 1952 through 1969 because they “ran party machines based on control over 
patronage.”203 Some of the functions they performed were “mobilizing local support, 
accommodating [state Congress parties] to local factions, providing opportunities for 
competing political elites, transmitting to state and central governments information 
about the local scene, and most importantly managing social conflict.”204 Congress, 
allowed state party bosses to deal with their own constituents, the people and groups they 
knew best, which guaranteed the satisfaction of local needs and the creation of credible 
leaders who could build coalitions within their states.205 State bosses best understood the 
factions within each of their states and were able to satisfy factional demands. Because 
Congress had these in-state mechanisms to satisfy the wide array of needs of multiple 
ethnicities and classes, it was opposed to creating coalitions with opposition parties 
because it had the manpower and resources to maintain a majority and stay in power.206 
These in-state mechanisms applied in all states except for Kerala, where Congress was 
competing with the Communist Party. The preventions of the spread of communism thus 
necessitated Congress to make an exception to its coalition policy.  
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1. Kerala Political Landscape and Hindu-Muslim Violence: 1950–1976 
Kerala’s historical political landscape presented Congress with unique challenges. 
In 1951, a left-leaning branch of Congress in Kerala broke off and formed the 
Communist Party of India (CPI).207 Kerala was also home to the only remaining post-
partition Muslim League organization. Therefore, predating the state’s formation in 1956, 
Kerala’s political landscape consisted of the CPI, Congress, the ML, and various 
Christian and socialist parties.208 Overall, the smaller caste and communal political 
groups put pressure on the larger political parties creating a system wherein minority 
groups’ grievances were heard and addressed.209 From the state’s inception, Kerala’s 
various groups coupled with the presence of the Communist Party necessitated a coalition 
government system, where political parties bound together to form a majority. The 
coalitions of this period, however, had no desire to develop “aggregate interests” among 
these groups, if not to simply gain the majority.210  
Therefore, coalition politics became standard practice in Kerala. Initially opposed 
to intercommunal coalitions, Congress’s strong desire to check the spread to communism 
in South India eventually led it to join in coalition with the Muslim League.211 However, 
Congress remained skeptical.212 In 1960, Congress, the ML, and the Praja Socialist Party 
formed the United Front against the CPI in Kerala and successfully ousted the 
Communists from power.213 However, after the elections, facing pressure for having 
joined forces with a communal group, Congress returned to its secularist ideology and 
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alienated the ML, causing the alliance to disintegrate.214 This reversal of Congress laid 
the foundation for the Seven-Party United Front Government of 1967.  
The 1967 elections in Kerala rode an anti-Congress wave with a coalition that 
consisted of the communist parties, the ML, and various socialist parties.215 Kerala’s 
political party coalitions were void of ideological foundations, as evidenced by the 
formation of the 1967 United Front that consisted of parties that had contested against 
each other in the previous election.216 However, void of ideological founding, the 
formation of the United Front was the birth of the coalition government in Kerala. The 
formation of coalitions is a trend that continues through to present day and allows even 
small political and communal parties to create coalitions and advance their particular 
needs, shifting their alliances when necessary and with impunity.217 In subscribing to 
coalition politics, the political parties of Kerala became interdependent despite their 
ethnic, religious, or caste differences. Allies in one election invariably became opponents 
in the next election and vice versa. Most importantly, however, these political coalitions, 
or civic institutions, recognized the need for each other’s support, be it immediate or at 
some point in the future.218 These coalitions were in essence movements for electoral 
politics.219 Albeit the movement only consisted of gaining the electoral majority, gaining 
the majority valued intercommunal civic institution building that subsequently led to low 
numbers of Hindu-Muslim violence.  
The intercommunal exchanges that occurred to establish these political coalitions 
discouraged and thwarted the use of communal violence by any political party.220 This is 
evident in the low Hindu-Muslim violence numbers in Kerala during this period (see 
Figure 4). Over 27 years, Kerala experienced only four lethal Hindu-Muslim violence 
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events. While it may be a state less prone to communal violence, Kerala is still not 
immune to it. This lack of immunity is especially evident in the face of high-profile 
agitation as seen in Kerala’s peak experience of two lethal Hindu-Muslim violence 
incidents in September and December of 1969, following the Ahmedabad riots that 
rocked the nation.221  
 
Note: Data from the Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 
8, 2004. 
Figure 4.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence Incidents in 
Kerala and Uttar Pradesh: 1950–1976. 
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2. Uttar Pradesh Political Landscape and Hindu-Muslim Violence: 
1950–1976 
Basing its ideology on the Nehruvian traditions that founded India, Congress was 
able to successfully appeal to the wide variety of constituents in Uttar Pradesh 
immediately following independence.222 This appeal lasted virtually unchallenged for 
almost 30 years as the INC remained the dominant political party in Uttar Pradesh until 
the 1977 elections. Historically, Uttar Pradesh’s population has consisted of 
approximately 20 percent scheduled castes, 20 percent forward castes, 40 percent 
backward castes and 16–18 percent Muslims.223 From a consociational perspective, the 
INC built a grand coalition among these groups with the use of the state-party-boss 
system discussed earlier in the chapter, and built consensus within the state, thus 
eliminating the need for building civic institutions and coalitions. Thus, while the INC 
maintained the monopoly of power, it did not allow civic institutions to develop. 
Allowing the development of civic institutions would have, in effect, put the INC out of a 
job. Civic institutions and their associated communal ties therefore remained 
undeveloped in Uttar Pradesh. Despite Uttar Pradesh’s lack of intercommunal civic 
institutions, the INC was still able to effectively and internally broker coalitions with 
minority ethnic and caste groups. Consequently, from 1950 to 1976, the INC was able to 
keep Hindu-Muslim violence low in Uttar Pradesh because of the consensus it built at the 
state-level.  
Because of the INC’s success in managing intergroup violence through consensus 
building, and despite the lack of Hindu-Muslim intercommunal civic institutions, Hindu-
Muslim violence established itself as an ordinary occurrence in Uttar Pradesh but at a 
relatively low rate (see Figure 4).224 Over 27 years, Uttar Pradesh experienced on average 
1.48 lethal Hindu-Muslim violence events per year, resulting in 40 lethal events total. 
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Uttar Pradesh’s strong consociational construct under the INC kept Hindu-Muslim 
violence numbers to a relative minimum during this period. Uttar Pradesh still 
experienced Hindu-Muslim violence during this period, under the INC, but at much lower 
levels than what was to come in the following 19 years.  
Hindu-Muslim violence levels between 1950 and 1976 remain low in both Kerala 
and Uttar Pradesh but for different reasons. In Kerala, the monopoly of power causes the 
creation of civic institutions through coalitions creating disincentives for Hindu-Muslim 
violence; in Uttar Pradesh, the INC builds consensus and maintains a grand coalition that 
results in relatively low Hindu-Muslim violence. 
B. INC’S MONOPOLY OF POWER AND HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE: 
1977–1995 
While Congress’s popularity waned in the late 1970s and Indira Gandhi 
eliminated state party organizations in her consolidation of power at the center, India saw 
more political parties assert themselves along caste, ethnic, and religious lines. From a 
consociational perspective, these assertions are examples of previously passive groups 
now becoming vocal and expressing their needs, thus weakening the consociational 
system.225 Zoya Hasan asserts that since the 1970s, all political parties have relied more 
on ethnic appeals rather than class-line appeals because “group identity has supplanted 
class interest as the chief vehicle of political mobilization.”226 As this occurs, 
competition among existing and emerging political parties increases. Since 1977, 
Congress has no longer been the dominant political party in India, and it will become less 
so as more parties emerge. This chapter discusses the effects of the INC’s organizational 
and consociational demise, the rise of ethnically based political parties, and the effects 
these events had on Hindu-Muslim violence between 1977 and 1995. 
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1. Kerala’s Political Landscape and Hindu-Muslim Violence: 1977–1995 
Kerala’s political landscape showed very little change from 1977–1995 when 
compared with the previous timeframe. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI 
(M)), now the major communist branch in Kerala, and its primary opponent, the INC, 
continued to dominate the Lok Sabha in Kerala.227 These larger parties continued to 
negotiate with smaller communal and ethnic parties to form the two major coalitions in 
Kerala, the Left Democratic Front, led by the CPI (M), and the United Democratic Front, 
led by the INC. As discussed earlier in the chapter, these coalitions can be considered 
“movement politics aimed at electoral politics,” leading to lower levels of Hindu-Muslim 
violence.228  
Similar to Kerala’s political landscape, Kerala witnessed little to no change 
regarding the amount of Hindu-Muslim violence it experienced. Despite its consistently 
low experience of Hindu-Muslim violence, Kerala was still susceptible to spikes in 
national levels of Hindu-Muslim violence. Varshney points out that in 1992, when the 
rest of India was rocked by the events at Ayodhya, Kerala’s relatively long period of 
peace was also disrupted.229 Additionally, comparing the rates at which Hindu-Muslim 
violence occurred between the two periods shows only a narrow deviation. The rate at 
which Hindu-Muslim violence occurred from 1950 to 1976 was 0.148 incidents per year. 
At that rate, this thesis estimates that 2.52 incidents of Hindu-Muslim violence would 
have occurred between 1977 and 1995. Kerala witnessed three lethal Hindu-Muslim 
violence incidents during this period, only 19 percent over the projected estimates based 
on the previous 27 years. 
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2. Uttar Pradesh’s Political Landscape and Hindu-Muslim Violence: 
1977–1995 
The broken success Congress experienced during the general elections from 1977 
to 1995 was indicative of the INC’s decline in popularity in Uttar Pradesh, due in part to 
its organizational demise and the weakening of its consociational construct. Therefore, 
because of the lack of civic institutions within Uttar Pradesh, the INC’s demise also 
resulted in increased Hindu-Muslim violence. A win at the polls in 1984 bisected decisive 
losses during the 1977 and 1989 general elections. After almost 30 years of single-party 
domination, the INC was no longer the singularly dominant political party in India.  
In direct response to the “excesses” of Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule, from 1975 
to 1977 Congress’s losses in Uttar Pradesh starkly confirmed Congress’s loss of support. 
During India’s 1977 general elections, the JP won all 85 Lok Sabha seats belonging to 
Uttar Pradesh. Shortly afterward, the 1980 general election saw a narrow statewide return 
to the Congress party; however, the Lok Dal and the JP trailed closely behind.230 
However, short-lived, the JP’s time in power demonstrated the demise of Congress’s 
single-party domination and the people’s desire to choose alternatively.  
After Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, Congress again won an 
overwhelming majority, taking 83 of the 85 seats in the Lok Sabha. While much of the 
public attributed Congress’s victory to the sympathy vote, Brass argues that the INC’s 
success was due to Rajiv Gandhi’s campaign focus on eliminating both internal and 
external threats to the state.231 Having recently experienced the devastating effects of a 
Sikh separatist threat, Congress successfully campaigned to lead the Indian nation on a 
security-based platform.  
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Then, in 1989, Congress saw a serious decrease in support, primarily visible in the 
disintegration of its supporters in Uttar Pradesh as they turned to caste-based political 
groups.232 The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) emerged as 
INC’s newest competitors. The BSP primarily appealed to the Scheduled Castes of Uttar 
Pradesh, while the SP took up the Backward Caste vote. Then, starting in the 1990s, the 
BJP displaced Congress as the dominant party in Uttar Pradesh.233 As discussed earlier, 
the BJP appealed to the upper caste Hindus who comprised approximately 20 percent of 
the state’s population.234 This support gave the BJP the ability to electorally edge out 
Congress. Additionally, Congress’s popularity decline in Uttar Pradesh accelerated 
because of its passive approach to the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, which alienated 
both Hindus and Muslims alike.235  
Prior to the 1991 general elections, the BJP pursued an anti-minority campaign to 
persuade the Hindu majority’s patronage in what the BJP expected to be a close electoral 
race against the Samajwadi Party and the BSP.236 Brass asserts that the BJP focused its 
effort on building Hindu support around the Ram Janmabhoomi movement while 
simultaneously contesting the recent findings of the Mandal Commission.237 
Encouraging Hindu-Muslim violence and contesting certain Hindu exclusions from 
segments of the Mandal Commission report, the BJP began its campaign drive. 
Wilkinson directly attributes the increases in Hindu-Muslim violence during late 1990 
and early 1991 to the BJP anti-minority campaign (see Figure 5).238 
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While the occurrence of Hindu-Muslim violence in Uttar Pradesh did not change 
qualitatively, it did show a significant quantitative jump in the period between 1977 and 
1995. Uttar Pradesh effectively demonstrates Varshney’s assertion that in the absence of 
civic institutions that provide intercommunal engagement opportunities, Hindu-Muslim 
violence thrives.239 Neither Hindus nor Muslims in Uttar Pradesh are fully integrated into 
any civic institutions that would offer protection from the escalation of violence directed 
at either group. The occurrence of lethal Hindu-Muslim violence during this period saw a 
more than threefold increase when compared with the previous 27 years in Uttar 
Pradesh.240 Based on the 1950 to 1976 rate at which Hindu-Muslim violence was 
projected to continue, Hindu-Muslim violence incidents would occur at 1.48 incidents per 
year. For the period between 1977 and 1995, this thesis estimates that 26 incidents of 
lethal Hindu-Muslim violence would have occurred. Instead, Uttar Pradesh witnessed 89 
lethal Hindu-Muslim violence incidents, 340 percent above projected estimates based on 
the previous 27 years. The compounded effects of the lack of intercommunal civic 
institution relationships to halt the incitement of Hindu-Muslim violence, the emergence 
of the BJP, which advocated Hindu-Muslim violence, and the increasing competition 
provided by the emergence of increasing numbers of lower caste political parties 
contributed to the increase of lethal Hindu Muslim incidents in Uttar Pradesh.  
                                                 




Note: Data from the Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 
8, 2004. 
Figure 5.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence  
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Note: Data from the Varshney Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, Version 2, October 
8, 2004. 
Figure 6.  Average Deaths per Incident Caused by Hindu-Muslim Violence  
in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh: 1950–1995. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Two observations emerge from the analysis completed in this chapter. First, the 
presence of civic institutions appears to be the key factor to communal peace, no matter 
what political party has the monopoly of power. The INC’s lack of a monopoly of power 
in Kerala enabled the development of civic institutions in the form of “movement politics 
aimed at electoral politics” or coalitions.241 These coalitions kept Kerala free of large 
amounts of Hindu-Muslim violence for the 45 years examined in this thesis. Ironically, 
the INC’s monopoly of power in Uttar Pradesh also kept Hindu-Muslim violence 
relatively low from 1950–1976. However, the INC’s monopoly of power prevented the 
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development of intercommunal civic institutions within the state, so upon the INC’s 
organizational demise and consociational weakening, intergroup violence arose in the 
form of Hindu-Muslim violence. The groups that the INC had previously negotiated with 
had no associations with each other once the INC was not the dominant political force.  
Second, despite Kerala’s experience of consistently low levels of Hindu-Muslim 
violence, the power of widespread national-level violence is demonstrated even in a state 
such as Kerala. Even with well-established civic institutions capable of thwarting the 
instigation of Hindu-Muslim violence amongst their state’s population, widespread 
national-level Hindu-Muslim violence is able to pierce those civic institutions and spark 
Hindu-Muslim violence.242 Spanning both of the examined periods, large-scale nation-
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This study verifies that the emergence of state-level civic institutions in the form 
of political coalitions for electoral gain prove the most effective means of keeping levels 
of Hindu-Muslim violence low.243 With or without a monopoly of power or single-party 
dominance, a state that can develop intercommunal civic institutions can insulate itself 
from the temptation of Hindu-Muslim violence and communal violence overall for 
political gain. As is the case with Kerala, intercommunal civic institutions at the state 
level or coalitions among communal political parties are developed from the outset of the 
state to combat the spread of the Communist Party within the state. Because of these 
coalitions, Hindu-Muslim violence has remained historically low in Kerala. Ironically, 
the INC’s consociational construct and maintenance of a grand coalition tempered 
intergroup violence during the time it had a monopoly of power in Uttar Pradesh. As the 
provider of consensus, the INC, however, inhibited the development of intercommunal 
civic institutions so that when the INC no longer maintained the monopoly of power in 
Uttar Pradesh, the state experienced increased levels of Hindu-Muslim violence. This 
lack of civic institutions, coupled with the solid entrance of the Hindu Nationalist 
political party, the BJP, exacerbated increases in Hindu-Muslim violence nationally and 
statewide.  
A. CURRENT TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The current trend among national parties vying for mass appeal in a country as 
large and diverse as India requires these parties to offer policies that are more centrist in 
nature. Varshney asserts that to come into power at the national level, political parties 
must offer a “multicaste, multiclass, multilinguistic and multireligious political 
platform.”244 Doing so forces political parties to move toward the center and become 
more moderate. Recently Hindu nationalists, in particular, have had to make many 
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ideological concessions to maintain power at the national level.245 Hindu nationalists 
have been forced to drop some of their more “ideologically pure” Hindu nationalist 
demands in order to form coalitions with other political parties and ensure their electoral 
success.246 These changes include their use of Hindu-Muslim violence as a recruitment 
tool, which accounts for the recent decrease in Hindu-Muslim violence nationwide. 
While the use of Hindu-Muslim violence has proven effective in the past for gaining 
constituents and votes in the Hindu majority, this tactic can simultaneously alienate 
Hindus as well. India’s political landscape today is one where every vote counts. 
Therefore, political parties in general and Hindu nationalists in particular are better off 
utilizing inclusive rather than exclusive tactics when pursuing electoral success. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To address the prevention of future communal violence in India, this thesis 
recommends the government of India do the following:  
1. Develop and implement a transparent and comprehensive policy for preventing 
communal violence.  
The closest the government of India has come to implementing such a policy thus 
far has been its efforts in drafting and discussing what exists today as the Government of 
India’s Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and 
Reparations) Bill, 2011. While the passing of this bill has been stalled, reinvigorating this 
effort would legitimize the government of India as a responsible actor concerned for 
public safety. Enacting such a bill would empower the central and state governments to 
prevent potentially provocative events from occurring. Currently, communally 
provocative events are prevented by concerned individuals via informal means. A recent 
example of these informal means is the reversal of a train that was carrying more than a 




thousand BJP members to a Hindu nationalist political rally in Jammu and Kashmir.247 
The central government and state train officials that sent the train back to its point of 
origin, Bangalore, acted on an informal basis to prevent what was obviously a communal 
violence incident waiting to happen. While the volatility of this event can be debated, the 
redrafting and passing of the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to 
Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011, might help better define the parameters for central 
and state officials’ capacity for preventing such events from occurring. A comprehensive 
policy would also offer the ability to prosecute those organizations that politicize issues 
in order to create communal disharmony. With the recent election of a majority BJP 
government into office, this discussion would be of particular significance, albeit highly 
optimistic, given the method by which the BJP has utilized Hindu-Muslim violence in the 
past.  
While the 1992 establishment of the National Foundation for Communal 
Harmony (NFCH) under the Ministry of Home Affairs is a commendable start, the 
foundation’s reach is limited. The foundation’s charter is to promote “communal 
harmony, fraternity and national integration amongst the diverse segments of [Indian] 
society.”248 The primary focus of its activities is to “implement programmes and projects 
for assisting in the rehabilitation of children affected by communal, caste, ethnic, terrorist 
and any other form of violence which fracture[s] social harmony.”249 Although an 
admirable effort, the foundation and its activities are largely reactionary and not 
preventative. In addition, the focus on child victims overlooks the needs of adults 
affected by communal violence. Lastly, the foundation is not currently tied into a 
forward-looking plan that lays a base for a society that is structured to prevent socially 
disruptive acts of communal violence from occurring, something that perhaps a revision 
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and implementation of the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to 
Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011, could offer.  
2. Promote nonpoliticized and transparent sociocultural awareness within India.  
Of the two recommendations, this one would be the harder to achieve because it 
calls for a cultural shift within the government of India and the people of India. As 
discussed in the sources section of Chapter I, to date the government of India has 
purposefully shrouded accounts of communal violence from the public.250 While done 
with the hopes of preventing further communal violence, the practice breeds ignorance on 
a relevant issue that has affected many people in the past and could potentially affect 
many more in the future. Additionally, the 2011 census publications have thus far omitted 
sociocultural data. Consequently, the most current sociocultural data released to the 
public was that which was collected for the year 2001. Although recent information was 
not provided for fear of the data being politicized, as it was in 2001, withholding this data 
deprives the public of gaining a clear understanding of the composition of Indian society. 
Rather than restrict information from the public, the government of India should firmly 
prosecute those who frame the information for political gain and consequent public 
disharmony. Again, the implementation of a comprehensive policy for preventing 
communal violence could help with this issue. 
The government of India should continue its efforts through the NFCH-organized 
Communal Harmony Campaign Week, an annual celebration of Indian diversity and the 
annual granting of the National Communal Harmony Award to individuals and 
organizations “for outstanding contribution[s] in the field of communal harmony and 
national integration.”251 Such efforts promote awareness and are visible reminders that 
the government takes sociocultural awareness seriously. 
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